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Abstract: 
How should environmental policy respond to economic fluctuations caused by persistent 
productivity shocks? This paper answers that question using a dynamic stochastic general 
equilibrium real business cycle model that includes a pollution externality. I first estimate the 
relationship between the cyclical components of carbon dioxide emissions and US GDP and find 
it to be inelastic. Using this result to calibrate the model, I find that optimal policy allows carbon 
emissions to be procyclical: increasing during expansions and decreasing during recessions. 
However, optimal policy dampens the procyclicality of emissions compared to the unregulated 
case. A price effect from costlier abatement during booms outweighs an income effect of greater 
demand for clean air. I also model a decentralized economy, where government chooses an 
emissions tax or quantity restriction and firms and consumers respond. The optimal emissions 
tax rate and the optimal emissions quota are both procyclical: during recessions, the tax rate and 
the emissions quota both decrease. 
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0. Introduction 
 
Business cycles can substantially affect an economy, and many policies recognize economic 
fluctuations and are designed to adapt to them. For example, unemployment insurance is 
designed to have a stabilizing countercyclical effect since payments increase with 
unemployment. Environmental policy, though, typically has not been designed to respond to 
business cycles, likely because the scale of most environmental policies is small relative to the 
economy. However, addressing global climate change will require policies that dwarf 
conventional environmental policies in scale and scope. Can climate policy designers continue to 
ignore business cycles, or does climate policy require a more explicit integration with 
macroeconomic fluctuations? 
 
This paper investigates how environmental policy optimally responds to business cycles. I 
develop a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with persistent productivity shocks and 
with pollution as a stock variable that negatively affects the economy. The model is calibrated to 
the US economy and to damages from carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas. I numerically 
solve for the dynamic optimal response of policy to shocks. A welfare analysis compares the 
dynamic policy that optimally adapts to productivity shocks to the best static policy that holds 
emissions constant at its long-run optimal value but ignores shocks. I also model a decentralized 
economy, where firms and consumers optimize in response to a government policy of pollution 
taxes or quantity constraints, potentially under information asymmetry. 
 
This analysis highlights the importance of allowing climate policy to adjust to business cycles in 
three ways. The first is from political economy reasons. Firms worry that a rigid cap will result 
in permit prices that are too high. Suggested methods of cost containment, for instance safety 
valve prices, are rather ad hoc. The suggested policy instrument in this paper represents the first-
best response to cost fluctuations, which may be more politically appealing to both polluters and 
environmentalists. Policies have been politically lambasted for not adapting to economic 
fluctuations. The clearing price of emissions permits after the first auction of the Regional 
Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) in September 2008 was $3.07 per ton of carbon dioxide, well 
below what was expected. A likely explanation is that the cap was set too high and inflexible 
given the unexpected downturn in the economy (Metcalf, 2009). The first-best policy here could 
alleviate political concerns on both sides of climate policy and eliminate the inclusion of ad hoc 
measures to adapt to business cycles.1 
 
Second, the welfare analysis in this paper shows that the net benefits of adapting to cycles are of 
a comparable magnitude to other environmental policies, although they may be smaller than 
those of getting the correct long-run policy. Third, these net benefits will not be uniformly 
distributed across all agents in the economy. Nearly all of the net benefits of the optimal policy 
come from smoothing abatement costs rather than pollution damages; this is because pollution is 
such a long-lived stock that cyclical fluctuations in emission do not substantially affect damages. 
Thus the beneficiaries of the cost saving from the optimal policy are those who bear the costs of 
the policy. Assuming forward shifting of the policy costs onto consumers, the burden of climate 
policy is strongly regressive (Metcalf et al., 2010). Backward shifting of the policy costs onto 
firms may also make the distribution of these cost savings important. Electricity generation 
contributes 41% of all US carbon dioxide emissions although electric utilities comprise only 
about 2.5% of the US economy. If utilities bear roughly half the burden of the policy, then the 
cost savings from dynamically optimizing may represent a large fraction of their overall 
expenses. 
 
Most of what we know already about how policy should respond to productivity shocks comes 
from studies that focus on optimal policy under information asymmetry over abatement costs; 
this includes Weitzman (1974) and its many extensions. These papers use a reduced form 
specification (typically quadratic) of costs and benefits of pollution. A total factor productivity 
shock can indirectly affect these reduced form functions. Instead of imposing a reduced form 
quadratic cost function and another reduced form quadratic benefit function, I begin with a 
standard dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model of real business cycles. I add to 
the standard model an externality that comes from an accumulated stock of pollution. The 
stochastic element of the model does not arise from shocks to abatement costs; rather, it comes 
from total factor productivity shocks. This creates a price and an income effect that can counter 
each other, such that the response of optimal policy is not apparent even in the absence of 
asymmetric uncertainty over the value of the shock.2 This choice of modeling is also 
advantageous in that I can draw upon a large prior RBC literature to calibrate the model. The 
reduced form shocks to abatement costs and benefits present in other models are likely due to 
productivity shocks, and here they are modeled directly as such. Furthermore, most of these 
earlier studies are static, and those that are dynamic do not model productivity shocks.3 Earlier 
papers are focused on information asymmetry. While this is not the focus of this paper, the 
model here is extended to include asymmetric uncertainty, when firms but not policymakers 
observe technology shocks. 
 
The paper begins with an empirical examination of how carbon dioxide emissions in the United 
States respond to cyclical fluctuations in GDP. I estimate the elasticity of emissions with respect 
to GDP. This question to my knowledge has not been answered econometrically. The expected 
sign of this elasticity is positive, but its magnitude has not been measured. Using monthly data 
on GDP and carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, I find that emissions are significantly procyclical 
with an elasticity between 0.5 and 0.9. Thus, emissions are inelastic with respect to output. This 
result is robust to a number of empirical specifications. The purpose of the empirical section is 
twofold. First, a measurement of this elasticity is interesting in and of itself (during a recession of 
a specified magnitude, by how much do we expect emissions to drop?). Second, the estimated 
elasticity is used as a parameter in the calibrated model. 
 
The model incorporates two offsetting effects from productivity shocks: a price effect and an 
income effect. A positive shock to productivity increases wealth, and so the income effect leads 
to higher demand for a clean environment and thus lower emissions. However, since capital is 
more productive after a positive productivity shock, the opportunity cost of spending on 
abatement instead of investing in capital is higher and thus abatement is relatively costlier. The 
price effect thus leads to lower demand for abatement and higher emissions. 
 
After calibrating and solving the dynamic model, I find that the optimal policy response to an 
economic expansion is to increase emissions, because the price effect dominates the income 
effect. In fact, a policy that pegs emissions to GDP is a good approximation of optimal policy. 
This qualitative result is robust to sensitivity analysis over several parameters. Simulating the 
decentralized economy shows that both the optimal emissions tax rate and the optimal emissions 
quota are procyclical; they increase during an expansion. Optimal policy thus dampens the 
procyclicality of emissions: emissions rise during booms and fall during busts, but not by as 
much as they would without optimal policy. An emissions quota policy is strengthened during 
recessions (the quota is reduced), while an emissions tax policy is weakened (the tax rate is 
reduced). This is perhaps a political advantage of taxes over quotas, if it is difficult to strengthen 
environmental policy during recessions. 
 
Fig. 1. Seasonally adjusted GDP and carbon emissions, US 1981–2003. Note: Emissions data are 
from Blasing et al. (2004) and represent total carbon emissions from fossil fuel combustion at the 
monthly level. They are seasonally adjusted using the X-12-ARIMA program. GDP data are 
from the Bureau of Economic Analysis and are seasonally adjusted. Both series are normalized 
to the January 1981 levels. 
 
Several previous studies have considered the relationship between business cycles and 
environmental policy.4 Kelly (2005) compares prices and quantities in a static general 
equilibrium setting with total factor productivity shocks. Strand (1995) develops a model of 
optimal environmental policy that includes worker moral hazard, with business cycles operating 
through stochastic changes in output prices. Bouman et al. (2000) develop a model to find the 
optimal time to invest in abatement under business cycles driven by preference shocks, and they 
find that the best time is during downturns. Fischer and Springborn (2009) is the only study 
besides this one that incorporates environmental policy into a real business cycle (RBC) model. 
Their focus is not on optimal dynamic policy, but rather on how various static policies perform 
in the presence of productivity shocks. They find that a cap on emissions dominates either an 
emissions tax or an intensity standard (restriction on emissions per unit output) because the cap 
reduces the volatility of all economic variables, not just emissions. 
 
In Section 1, I present some dynamic descriptive statistics and regression results regarding the 
relationship between business cycles and carbon dioxide emissions in the US. Section 2 presents 
a dynamic model of a social planner’s problem, which is calibrated in Section 3. The model is 
solved and simulation results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 presents a decentralized 
version of the dynamic model, where competitive firms and utility maximizing consumers react 
to government policy of an emissions tax. Section 6 concludes. 
 
1. Empirical analysis 
I investigate the relationship between business cycles and emissions using emissions data at the 
monthly or quarterly level. While the rest of this paper is a normative analysis of optimal policy, 
this section is purely a descriptive analysis of how carbon emissions respond to business cycles 
in an economy without optimal policy. In fact, no carbon policy was in effect during this period 
of analysis. The estimated elasticity is used in the normative analysis; to know how emissions 
ought to vary with cycles one must know how they do (sub-optimally) vary without any policy. 
The lack of any carbon policy alleviates one endogeneity concern, since carbon policy will not 
itself be adjusting with the business cycle. What is measured is the “natural” response of carbon 
emissions to aggregate changes in output. Though the choice of firms and households in how 
much to pollute is endogenous (i.e. they respond to the business cycle), this choice is precisely 
what I want to measure. 
 
Blasing et al. (2004) provide estimates of monthly emissions of carbon dioxide from fossil fuel 
combustion in the United States from 1981 to 2003.5 Fig. 1 plots seasonally adjusted monthly 
levels of nationwide emissions and monthly real GDP. Both series are normalized so that the 
starting value is 1 (in January 1981).6 Over the period of analysis, both GDP and carbon 
emissions grew, but at different rates, so that the carbon intensity of the economy declined. GDP 
increased by a factor of 2, while carbon emissions increased only 25%. Business cycle effects 
can also clearly be seen in this figure; recessions in the early 1980s, early 1990s, and early 2000s 
are reflected in the GDP curve. Concurrently with these recessions, carbon emissions appear to 
drop off. Similarly, when GDP is rising at a fast rate, carbon emissions appear to do the same. 
This happens during the expansionary period of the mid- to late-1990s. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Cyclical components of GDP and carbon emissions. Note: The values are the cyclical 
residuals from applying the HP filter to quarterly carbon emissions and GDP data. 
 
While basic patterns can be seen from eyeballing Fig. 1, a more thorough method of identifying 
cycles in output or in emissions is available. The Hodrick–Prescott (HP) filter is a commonly 
used method to detrend time series, separately identifying the trend component from the cyclical 
component.7 I aggregate the monthly emissions and GDP data to the quarterly level, take the 
natural log of the values, and use the HP filter with 1600 as the smoothness parameter λ. 
 
The cyclical component of the detrended data is presented in Fig. 2. The patterns in the GDP 
curve correspond to recessions: troughs in the early 1980s, the early 1990s, and the early 2000s. 
For the emissions curve, some of these troughs can be clearly identified concurrently, especially 
in the early 1980s and early 1990s recessions. The correlation between the two series seems to 
dissipate starting in the late 1990s, though a drop in GDP in 2000 is accompanied by one in 
emissions as well. 
 
The standard deviation of cyclical GDP is 1.31%, while the standard deviation of cyclical carbon 
emissions is 2.04%, so emissions are more variable than GDP. The correlation coefficient 
between the two time series is 0.5627, with a p-value less than 0.0001. The two time series are 
strongly correlated.8 Unsurprisingly, when output increases, so do carbon emissions. 
 
These data can also be analyzed using time-series analysis. Unconditional correlations show that 
periods of higher GDP (in deviations from trend) tend to occur with periods of higher CO2 
emissions. What is the magnitude of this relationship? Are emissions elastic or inelastic with 
respect to GDP? Table 1 presents regression results to identify the magnitude of the relationship 
between CO2 emissions and GDP. In column 1, I present regression results from a seasonal 
ARIMA(1, 1, 1)×(0, 1, 1)12 regression of the log of emissions on the log of GDP.9 The 
regression results show that CO2 emissions are inelastic with respect to GDP, with a coefficient 
of 0.758. An alternative method of dealing with the seasonal component of the emissions data is 
to perform the regression on the emissions data that have already been seasonally adjusted. This 
is done is column 2, and the coefficient on GDP is almost identical to that in column 1.10 
 
Both of these regressions use first differencing to eliminate the trend from the two time series. 
Alternatively, a number of other filters are available to identify the trend. The most commonly 
used filter in the business cycle literature is the HP filter. Column 3 presents regression results 
where the dependent variable is the deviation from trend in the log of CO2 emissions, 
determined by the HP filter, and the independent variable is the deviation from trend in the log of 
GDP. The smoothing parameter λ is set at 129,600, the standard value for monthly data. A least 
squares regression is performed, allowing for a Newey–West specification of the error term. The 
coefficient is consistent with the results from the ARIMA regressions; CO2 emissions are 
inelastic with respect to GDP. 
 
Table 1 CO2 emissions and GDP regressions, monthly. 
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Seasonall
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(0.175) 
 
0.696*** 
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0.639***(0.14
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0.545***(0.0061
1) 
 
0.723**(0.28
0) 
Observatio
ns  
263  275  276  180  276  276 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. The dependent variable in each regression is the log of 
carbon dioxide emissions, adjusted or detrended as labeled. Column 1 presents results from a 
seasonal ARIMA(1, 1, 1) ×(0, 1, 1)12 regression of log of CO2 (not seasonally adjusted) on log 
of GDP. Column 2 presents results from an ARIMA(1, 1, 2) regression of log of CO2 
(seasonally adjusted) on log of GDP. AR, MA, and cointegrating equation terms are not reported 
for either regression. Columns 3–6 present results from least squares regression of detrended 
emissions on detrended output allowing for Newey–West standard errors, where the series are 
detrended by either Hodrick–Prescott (column 3), Baxter–King (column 4), Christiano–
Fitzgerald (column 5), or Butterworth (column 6) filters. Optimal lag lengths are all determined 
by minimizing Akaike Information Criterion. Constant term is omitted from regressions using 
detrended series. 
*** p < 0.01. 
** p < 0.05. 
 
The HP filter is not the only method for detrending time series. Three additional filters are 
applied to the data, and regression results on the detrended data are presented in columns 4–6. 
The Baxter–King filter is a bandpass moving average filter that filters out the trend as well as 
higher frequency components. The minimum and maximum periodicities are set at 18 and 96 
months, respectively (Baxter and King, 1999). The Christiano–Fitzgerald filter is a random walk 
filter, and the same minimum and maximum periodicities are used as in the Baxter–King filter. 
Finally, the digital Butterworth filter is a rational square wave filter. In regressions presented in 
columns 4–6, I detrend the GDP and CO2 emissions series with each of the three filters and run 
the same regression as in column 3. 
 
The purpose of these additional regressions is not to make any claim about which filtering 
method is preferable. Rather, I seek to demonstrate that the key result found in the first three 
columns of Table 1 is robust to a wide range of filtering methods. In fact, this is what I find, as 
can be seen from the regression coefficients in Table 1. The coefficient on the deviation from 
trend in GDP is consistently positive and between 0.5 and 0.9. The result that emissions are 
procyclical but inelastic with respect to GDP is thus quite robust. The elasticity is significantly 
positive in all columns and significantly less than one in all columns except the third and sixth. 
In addition, analogous regressions on data that are aggregated to the quarterly level yield results 
almost identical to those presented in Table 1. The results are also robust to varying the lag 
lengths in the ARIMA regressions and varying the smoothing parameter(s) in each of the filters, 
and all regressions are robust to including world oil spot prices and seasonally adjusted 
temperatures as exogenous regressors.11 Similar results are found from panel data regressions on 
state-level annual emissions (presented in the online appendix). 
 
2. Model — centralized economy 
The static model presented in the online appendix formalizes intuition regarding two conflicting 
effects that push for more and less abatement during periods of high productivity, but it fails to 
account for dynamic considerations. At least three such considerations are built into the 
following dynamic model, corresponding to three state variables. First, the productivity shock at 
is likely to be autocorrelated. This autocorrelation of factor productivity shocks is in fact what 
drives RBC models. Thus, a high value of the shock in one period also serves as a signal about 
the likely shock in subsequent periods. Second, capital k in the economy is a stock. Choosing to 
save more during one period leads to more resources available for consumption or abatement in 
subsequent periods, after depreciation. Third, the damages from pollution may come not just 
from emissions in the current period but from the total stock of emissions. This stock is a 
function of current and past levels of emissions, subject to a depreciation rate unique to the 
pollutant. For example, CO2 has a half-life in the atmosphere of several decades. Ground-level 
SO2 has a half-life of only a few days, so for the purposes of a quarterly business cycle model, it 
can be considered purely as a flow. Furthermore, for a global pollutant like CO2, the stock is 
determined not just by domestic emissions but also by emissions from the rest of the world. 
 
In this Section 1 consider a centralized economy; that is, I model the social planner’s problem. In 
the standard RBC model, this choice of modeling is justified by the fact that the economy lacks 
externalities and thus satisfies the first fundamental theorem of welfare economics, so the 
solution to the planner’s problem coincides with the allocations of the competitive equilibrium. 
Here, the first fundamental theorem is not generally expected to be satisfied because of the 
externalities imposed by pollution. In this section, I present a model of optimal policy, in the 
case where a central authority can select investment, abatement, and consumption for the 
representative consumer. Later, I model a decentralized economy, where government can attempt 
to fix the inefficiencies associated with the pollution externality through a policy, such as an 
emissions tax or tradable permits. The model allows for exogenous growth in technology, 
consumption, or output, though it is not explicitly modeled. As with other RBC models, this 
model can be derived from a model that includes a constant growth rate; see the online appendix 
for an example of such an extension.12 The assumption that technology is invariant makes the 
model stationary and allows analysis of fluctuations about the steady state. 
 
Consider a representative agent, whose choices match those of a social planner, with access to 
production technology yielding potential output at f (kt−1), a function of a current productivity 
shock at and capital carried over from last period, kt−1. Output is affected negatively from the 
stock of pollution in period t, xt. The total output yt is yt = (1−d(xt ))at f (kt−1), where d is an 
increasing function that takes values between 0 and 1 and represents the loss of potential output 
from pollution.13 In each period, the agent chooses quantities of consumption ct, abatement zt , 
and investment it, subject to the resource constraint determined by current production: ct + zt + it 
_ yt . Note that just one input is used in production. Labor is not included in the model, since this 
paper is not concerned with employment fluctuations.14 Income is not exogenous; it is 
determined by the agent’s choice of investment in the previous period along with the current 
productivity. 
 
The agent’s utility function is defined over consumption: U(ct ). The pollution stock decays at a 
linear rate equal to η: xt = ηxt−1 + et + ero t , where et is current-period domestic emissions and 
erowt is current-period emissions from the rest of the world. The policy-maker cannot choose the 
level of emissions from the rest of the world but can choose the level of domestic emissions. 
Domestic emissions are a function of total production yt and abatement. Let et = (1−μt ) ·h(yt ), 
where μt ∈ [0, 1] is the fraction of emissions abated in period t, and h is the function determining 
how emissions are related to output, holding constant abatement. Emissions could thus increase 
more rapidly than output if h is convex, or they could increase less rapidly if h is concave. The 
fraction of emissions abated μt is determined by total abatement spending zt via 
the equation zt/yt = g(μt ); g thus relates the fraction of emissions abated to the fraction of output 
spent on abatement (the price of abatement is normalized to one). The stock of capital evolves 
with a decay rate δ: kt = (1−δ)kt−1 +it . Finally, the technology shock evolves according to a 
Markov process, so that the probability distribution of at+1 is a function of at. 
 
At the beginning of a period, kt−1 and xt−1 are already determined, and the realization of the 
productivity shock at occurs. Given those three state variables, the representative agent chooses 
abatement, consumption, and investment to maximize total expected discounted utility, subject to 
the constraints described above. This can be written as a dynamic programming problem in the 
following way: 
 
The operator Et represents the expectation of future values of at+1 at period t, and the discount 
factor is β. The problem can be rewritten, taking into account the constraints, as a choice over 
only the non-stochastic variables kt and xt . Assuming the appropriate transversality conditions,15 
first order conditions can be found for the choice of both variables. They are: 
 
 
 
The first equation is the first order condition for the choice of kt , which is equivalent to the 
choice of investment this period it. The first term, −U_ , is the marginal cost of an additional unit 
of investment, which is the foregone marginal benefit of an additional unit of consumption. The 
second (long) term is the marginal benefit of an additional unit of investment. It is not realized 
until next period, so it is discounted and taken as an expectation. It equals the marginal benefit of 
an additional unit of consumption (U_) times the marginal effect that investment has on next 
period’s consumption. This marginal effect is composed of the terms in the curly brackets in the 
second line of the equation: the gross return on capital, net of depreciation, plus the marginal 
environmental damage caused by the increase in capital. The second equation above is the first 
order condition for the choice of the pollution stock xt . The first part, on the top line, is the 
marginal effect on current consumption from an additional unit of xt . It is composed of a 
negative term (the first half of the expression in the curly brackets), because more pollution 
reduces output and thus available consumption, and a positive term (the second half of the 
expression in the curly brackets), because more pollution means less was spent on abatement and 
thus more available for consumption. The second part of the first order condition, on the second 
line, is the marginal effect on next period’s consumption. It is negative, since the additional unit 
of xt this period increases the amount of abatement necessary next period to achieve an 
equivalent level of emissions next period, thus reducing the budget for consumption next period. 
 
3. Calibration 
 
The sources for the calibration of the model fall into two main groups: macroeconomic 
parameters are taken from the RBC literature, and parameters related to emissions are taken from 
several studies that estimate the costs and benefits of emissions reductions. One additional 
parameter is estimated from the empirical results presented above. The model is calibrated to the 
US economy, and the pollutant considered is carbon dioxide, the leading greenhouse gas. 
 
The model is calibrated, not estimated. Estimation of DSGE models typically relies on the first 
fundamental theorem of welfare economics to ensure that the optimal allocation, from the model, 
coincides with the competitive outcome, found in the data. Here, as mentioned earlier, this 
theorem cannot be invoked, since the pollution externality violates an assumption necessary for 
the theorem. Therefore, I calibrate the model using previously estimated parameter values where 
available, and I estimate one parameter that is not available. 
 
The macroeconomic parameters include a functional form and parameterization for the 
production function, the process governing the productivity shocks, the capital decay rate, and 
the discount factor. All of these parameters are commonly used in RBC papers, and it is to those 
papers that I turn for their calibration. Specifically, the values I use here are those used in recent 
RBC literature, including Chang and Kim (2007), and pioneering papers, including Kydland and 
Prescott (1982).16 
The production function is f (k) = kα, where 0 < α < 1 to accommodate positive but diminishing 
marginal returns. In most RBC models, two inputs to production are present: capital and labor. 
Then, the production function is Cobb–Douglas: f (k, l) = kαl1−α. The capital share of income is 
taken as the value α. Here, production has only one input, since I am unconcerned with the labor 
market. In other words, the model here assumes fixed labor inputs and models only the response 
of capital inputs to production.17 The value used for α is 0.36, capital’s share in national income. 
 
Each period of time is one quarter. Capital depreciation δ is 2.5%, and the discount factor β is 
0.98627, consistent with a quarterly rate of return to capital of 1%. This is equivalent to an 
annual discount rate of about 5% and annual capital depreciation of about 9.6%. Finally, the 
productivity shock evolves according to a Markov process with the following equation: lnat = ρ 
lnat−1 + εt , where the persistence parameter ρ is 0.95, and εt is an IID shock distributed 
normally, with mean zero and standard deviation σε = 0.007. The agent’s utility function is 
isoelastic: U(c) = c1−ϕc 1−ϕc. The coefficient of relative risk aversion φc is set to equal 2 (Stern, 
2008; Weitzman, 2007).18  
 
Next I use chemistry and economics studies to calibrate the functions regarding emissions. The 
decay equation for the stock of pollution in the atmosphere, xt = ηxt−1 + et + erowt , contains the 
parameter η, which can be calibrated from the half-life of atmospheric carbon dioxide. This value 
is not precisely known, and various papers use different estimates.19 For my base case, I use 83 
years, the value used in Reilly (1992). In sensitivity analysis, I see how this parameter affects the 
results. A half-life of 83 years implies a quarterly parameter η of 0.9979. I assume that rest-of-
world emissions erow are maintained at a constant level erow; international emissions do not 
respond to domestic business cycles. The US is responsible for about one-fourth of global 
anthropogenic carbon emissions, so erow is set at three times the steady-state value of e. 
 
Table 2 Base case parameter values. 
 
Parameter  Value  Description  Source 
α  0.36  Curvature of 
production function: f 
(k) = (k)α  
Chang and Kim 
(2007), Kydland and 
Prescott (1982) 
β  0.98267  Quarterly discount 
rate 
 
δ  0.025  Quarterly capital 
depreciation 
 
ρ  0.95  Persistence of 
productivity shock 
 
σε  0.007  Standard deviation of 
IID productivity 
innovation 
 
η  0.9979  Pollution decay Reilly 
(1992) 
 
θ1  0.05607  Abatement cost 
function: Nordhaus 
(2008) 
 
θ2  2.8  g(μ) = θ1μθ2  
d2  1.4647e−8  Pollution damages 
function: 
 
d1  −6.6722e−6  d(x) =d2x2 +d1x +d0  
d0  1.3950e−3   
φc,φx  2  Coefficient of relative 
risk aversion  
Stern (2008), 
Weitzman (2007) 
(1 −γ )  0.696  Elasticity of emissions 
with respect to output 
 Estimated from 
monthly emissions 
and GDP data, see 
Table 1 
 
The damages from atmospheric carbon dioxide have been estimated in other papers, including in 
Nordhaus (1991, 2008) and Stern (2008). I calibrate d(x) from the DICE-2007 model in 
Nordhaus (2008) as described in the online appendix. Fitting the function to a quadratic d(x) = 
d2x2 + d1x + d0 yields d2 = 1.4647e−8, d1 =−6.6722e−6, and d0 = 1.3950e−3, where the units 
of x are gigatons of atmospheric carbon (GtC). For the 2005 value of atmospheric carbon mass of 
about 800 gigatons, this creates an output loss of 0.26%. A doubling of the carbon mass to 1600 
GtC creates an output loss of 2.54%.20 
 
The abatement cost function g(μt ) gives the cost, as a ratio of total output, of reducing the 
fraction μt of baseline emissions. This function is taken directly from Nordhaus (2008). The 
function form used is g(μ) = θ1μθ2 . The calibrated value of the exponent θ2 is 2.8, indicating a 
convex cost function. The coefficient, θ1, is actually a function of time in Nordhaus (2008), 
where each time period is ten years. I use the initial value (calibrated to 2005) of 0.05607, though 
this value decreases over time slightly (it drops to 0.0392 in 50 years).21 
 
Finally, the function mapping output to emissions controlling for abatement, h, is estimated from 
the data described in Section 1. I impose an isoelastic form to the function, so that et = (1 − 
μt)h(yt ) and h(yt ) = y1−γt . The parameter γ is calibrated based on an estimation of the log of 
emissions on the log of output, where the regression coefficient is 1 − γ . 
The assumption behind this calibration is that μt is constant and unaffected by yt , which is 
unlikely to fail given that no climate policy existed during the period examined. Regression 
results are presented in Table 1. The coefficient on the log of GDP ranges from 0.55 to 0.88. For 
the base case value of γ , I use the results from the initial ARIMA regression on the seasonally 
adjusted series from column 2 of Table 1, giving an exponent for h of 1 − γ = 0.696. I vary this 
parameter in sensitivity analysis. 
 
Table 2 describes the parameters in the model, gives their calibrated base case values, and lists 
the source of each parameter calibration. 
 
4. Model solution and simulation 
 
I solve the model by log-linearizing about the steady state and analytically solving the system of 
linear rational expectations equations. This solution method is fast (taking less than one second 
on a typical PC) and it removes the need for discretizing or approximating. However, it comes as 
a cost: the non-linear model is approximated as a system of linear equations. This will not be a 
large problem here since I focus on small fluctuations about the steady state.22 The system of 
linear equations is solved using the Anderson–Moore algorithm (AMA).23 The system of linear 
equations and the method for implementing the AMA are presented in the online appendix. The 
Matlab code is available on the author’s website.24 
 
The solution provides a set of matrices that describes how the choice variables (ct ,kt , xt ) 
respond to different values of the state variables (xt−1,kt−1,at ). This solution is difficult to 
interpret, but the results can be summarized graphically in two ways. First, one can examine 
impulse response functions: given a non-zero value of εt in period t = 0 and no non-zero values 
in any other periods, what is the response path of the choice variables? Second, one can simulate 
a series of shocks εt and analyze the response of variables to those shocks. This simulates the 
actual business cycles in the economy and how policy can optimally respond. 
 
4.1 Base case simulation 
 
Impulse response functions for the base case parameters are plotted in Figs. 3 and 4. Both figures 
come from the same simulation of 100 periods, but they plot different variables (except for the 
productivity shock a, which is plotted in both figures). In the simulation, an innovation to the 
productivity shock εt occurs in period 1. The size of this shock is 1%, about one-and-a-half times 
σε, the standard deviation of the innovation in the calibrated model. Fig. 3 plots the proportional 
deviation from the steady-state value of the productivity shock a along with economic variables 
traditionally seen in RBC models: output y, capital stock k and consumption c. Fig. 4 repeats the 
plot the productivity shock a, while adding the response of three variables related to pollution: 
abatement z, single-period emissions e and pollution stock x. The path of the productivity shock 
in both of these figures is exogenous; it decays at the rate ρ = 0.95. The value of output y is also 
decreasing along with productivity. Output is not perfectly coincidental with productivity, since 
the choice between allocating resources between savings and consumption is altered by the 
productivity shock. If the capital stock and pollution stock were kept fixed at the steady-state 
value, then the a and y curves would be coincidental. Fig. 3 shows, though, that capital is 
responding to the increased productivity. More is being invested, and thus capital is higher than 
it is in the steady state. Because capital is a stock good, its peak does not coincide with the 
productivity peak in period 1. Capital peaks around period 40 (year 6). Similarly, consumption is 
higher thanks to the increased productivity, but its peak occurs around period 15. The lag 
between the peak of productivity and the peak of consumption is not because consumption is a 
stock; it is not. Rather, it is a function of the resource constraint in each period, which is 
dependent on capital, a stock. 
 
 
Fig. 4. Impulse response functions — B. 
 
Fig. 4 shows how optimal emissions policy responds to the productivity shock. The path of 
productivity is included again in Fig. 4 for comparison. Note that the y-axis scale is increased. 
The increased productivity induces an increase in abatement expenditure z. Although more is 
being spent on abatement, the increase in output means that emissions will be higher for a fixed 
level of abatement. It is thus unclear in which direction emissions will go, but Fig. 4 shows that 
emissions e are higher after the productivity shock. This demonstrates the fact that, in the base 
case calibration of the model, the price effect dominates the income effect. Higher productivity 
yields more income, and the absence of pollution is a normal good, so less emissions will be 
demanded. On the other hand, abatement is costlier with high productivity, so the price effect 
causes more emissions to be demanded.25 Finally, note that the curve for pollution x exhibits two 
striking features: it is of a much smaller magnitude than the other curves, and it is more 
persistent. Even after 100 periods it has not quite yet reached its peak. Both of these features are 
due to the fact that the decay rate for CO2 is so low (η = 0.9979), so a change in any one year’s 
emissions has little effect on the total stock, and deviations from the steady state of emissions 
take a long time to decay. 
 
What do these impulse response functions say about how optimal policy responds to productivity 
shocks, for the base case given by these parameters? Three qualitative lessons can be learned. 
First, optimal emissions are procyclical; that is, periods of higher productivity are allowed higher 
emissions. Second, to a first order, a policy that pegs allowable emissions to GDP is optimal. 
Comparing the curve for y in Fig. 3 to the curve for e in Fig. 4, it appears that these two values 
are almost identical in shape.26 Third, the magnitudes of the adjustments to the pollution stock 
are quite small, because of the low decay rate of emissions. 
 
Next, I simulate a draw of productivity shock innovations εt from its calibrated distribution and 
see how the economy responds to that series of shocks. This is a simulation of an actual RBC 
economy, as opposed to the impulse response functions, which are abstractions designed to see 
the qualitative nature of responses. These simulations cannot explicitly show how individual 
policy variables respond to particular productivity shocks, but they can provide summary 
statistics of the nature of the business cycles under the optimal solution, such as the standard 
deviations of output and emissions, or the covariance of output and emissions. 
 
Each simulation is of course dependent on the particular draw of shocks. Fig. 5 presents the 
results from one such draw. The curve marked with squares is output. For this draw of shocks, 
after an initial 20 periods of fluctuations near zero, the economy experiences a long expansion 
followed by a long recession. The curve marked with circles is emissions; it closely follows 
output. This conforms with the impulse response functions, where the curves for k and e were 
close to each other. The curve marked with diamonds in Fig. 5 is the capital stock. The lag 
between the peaks of capital and the peaks of output is consistent with the lagged peak found for 
capital in the impulse response function; it is because capital is stock that accumulates over time. 
Finally, the curve marked with triangles is the pollution stock. It appears almost flat, though it 
actually fluctuates somewhat. As in the impulse response functions, its small magnitude is due to 
its very low decay rate. 
 
 
Fig. 5. Business cycle simulation. 
 
Finally, the base case simulation results can be used to conduct welfare analysis. In particular, 
how valuable is it to society to enact the dynamically optimal policy rather than proceed with a 
static policy that fixes the level of emissions at the steady-state value? To answer this, I simulate 
the dynamically optimal economy as well as a sub-optimal economy where emissions are kept 
constant at the steady-state level.27 The improvement that the dynamically optimal policy 
provides over the static policy is the compensating variation between the two policies, defined in 
terms of a consumption metric. This compensating variation is defined as the level of 
consumption cv such that the representative agent is indifferent between the dynamically optimal 
policy and the static policy with an additional cv units of consumption given to him in each 
period.28 The compensating variation is a function of the particular draw of shocks, so I run 250 
simulations and use the median value found. When calibrated to total level of domestic 
consumption expenditures, the compensating variation is about $950 million per year (in 2005 
US$). This is a comparable magnitude to the estimated net benefits of other environmental 
policies. For example, Carlson et al. (2000) estimate that the cost savings from the US’s sulfur 
dioxide capand-trade program compared to a command-and-control program is $700–$800 
million annually. Oates et al. (1989) find net benefits from an improvement in emissions 
standards for the pollutant total suspended particulates (TSP) in Baltimore, MD, on the order of 
$20–$50 million. For comparison, Nordhaus’s (2008) calculation of the net benefits from climate 
policy that is optimal in the long-run but does not accommodate business cycles implies annual 
domestic net benefits of approximately $7 billion.29 As mentioned in the Introduction, although 
small as a fraction of total GDP, these net benefits are likely to be non-uniformly distributed 
across the economy, such that for some households (especially the poorest) and some firms 
(especially electric utilities) the cost savings from the optimal policy are quite substantial. 
 
 
Fig. 6. Sensitivity analysis — effect of emissions elasticity (1−γ ) on emissions. 
 
 
Fig. 7. Sensitivity analysis — effect of emissions elasticity (1−γ ) on fraction of output spent on 
abatement (μ). 
 
4.2 Sensitivity analysis 
 
The results presented thus far are taken from simulations using the base case parameter values, 
listed in Table 2. Sensitivity analysis can be done by varying these parameters and seeing the 
effect on policy. I first perform sensitivity analysis on γ , the parameter that defines the elasticity 
of emissions with respect to output when abatement is held constant. This parameter was 
estimated, and its base case value was 0.696 (Table 1). The estimate from Table 1, though, varies 
across columns. Although all columns of that table find that emissions are inelastic, in Figs. 6 
and 7, I vary 1 − γ , the elasticity, from 0.25 to 1.2. When 1 − γ > 1, emissions are elastic. Fig. 6 
plots the deviation from steady state in emissions resulting from a 1% positive productivity 
shock under the different values of γ . Higher values of 1 − γ imply a higher deviation from 
steady state of emissions in response to the shock. Even if the change in output was no different 
between the five simulations shown in Fig. 6, these results are expected, since the parameter that 
is varied gives the response of emissions to changes in output. Optimal policy dampens the 
cyclicality of emissions at a higher rate the higher is the elasticity of emissions with respect to 
output. 
 
 
In Fig. 7, I plot the effect of parameter value deviations on μ, the fraction of output that is spent 
on abatement. Here the impact of γ qualitatively can be seen. When the elasticity 1−γ is 0.5 or 
0.25, μ decreases after a positive productivity shock. This differs from when 1−γ is at its base 
case value of 0.696 or when it is 1 or greater; in those cases μ increases after an increase in 
productivity. If 1 − γ _ 0.5 and the economy experiences a positive productivity shock, the 
optimal response is to reduce the fraction of emissions abated. Note, however, that emissions rise 
after the shock under all of the alternative values of γ . When emissions are very inelastic to 
output (1 − γ is low), then an increase in output caused by a positive productivity shock results in 
a relatively low emissions increase, holding abatement constant. The optimal response of 
abatement spending, then, will be relatively low. When emissions are inelastic enough (1 − γ _ 
0.5), then the optimal response is to actually reduce abatement spending as a fraction of total 
output. 
 
Each of the simulations represented in Figs. 6 and 7 assumes that the elasticity parameter is 
constant throughout a simulation. Some evidence suggests that this elasticity can vary with total 
output. Annual CO2 emissions data from the US can be used to show that responses of emissions 
to business cycle shocks were much greater in the distant past (1870–1938) than more recently 
(1939–2007).30 Accommodating this feature of the economy is not possible in the above solution 
method, which assumes that deviations about any growth path are identical to deviations about 
the steady state. Instead, to investigate the effect of a changing elasticity, I solve the model using 
value function iteration (VFI) and simulate fluctuations about a growth path. I allow the 
elasticity of emissions with respect to output to decrease with output, and then examine the 
optimal emissions path of fluctuations about the growth path. The results along the growth path 
(available upon request) reinforce the intuition behind the results presented in Fig. 6. In earlier, 
poorer periods, when the emissions elasticity is larger, the optimal response of emissions to 
productivity shocks is larger, compared to later, richer periods, when the emissions elasticity is 
smaller. 
 
The next parameter that is varied, in Figs. 8 and 9, is the coefficient of relative risk aversion φc . 
The base case version is calibrated to 2. In Figs. 8 and 9 I allow this value to be 0.5 (low risk 
aversion), 1 (log utility), or 3 (high risk aversion), in addition to the base case value. Kelly 
(2005) finds, in a model similar to the one here but static, that the relative risk aversion of the 
representative agent has a substantial impact on the choice between price and quantity 
instruments. This suggests that the same coefficient may impact the tradeoff between the income 
and price effects in this model. Fig. 8 shows that varying this parameter has little impact on the 
path of emissions. Fig. 9 plots the response of consumption. With higher risk aversion, the agent 
smooths consumption more in response to the positive shock compared to when risk aversion is 
low. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Sensitivity analysis — effect of φc on emissions. 
 
 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity analysis — effect of φc on consumption. 
 
 
Fig. 10. Sensitivity analysis — effect of pollution decay rate (η) on emissions. 
 
One parameter of interest is the decay rate of the pollution stock, η. In the base case this value is 
0.9979, corresponding to a half-life of 83 years, but this value is uncertain. How sensitive is the 
optimal policy to this parameter? Fig. 10 suggests that the answer is not very sensitive. It plots 
the curve for e, but it presents the responses under six different values of η, going down all the 
way to zero, representing a pure flow pollutant like SO2 or NOx. Surprisingly, the results are not 
very sensitive to this parameter. Even when pollution is purely a flow, the optimal emissions 
path is almost identical to the one in the base case, in which CO2 has a long half-life.31 Fig. 11 
shows the optimal impulse response functions for the pollution stock. Here, the differences are 
clear, and they are due to the different decay rates of the pollution stock. Intuitively, one might 
think that the income effect should have more bite for a flow pollutant (η = 0) than for a stock 
pollutant. For a stock pollutant, society does not care much about fluctuations in single-period 
emissions since they have little effect on the value of the stock. Thus the income effect of 
cyclical fluctuations in emissions is higher for a flow pollutant, and optimal emissions ought to 
be lower when society is richer. However, there is a counteracting component of the income 
effect: for a stock pollutant, the effect of a fluctuation in single-period emissions remains longer 
than for a flow pollutant. Though society cares less in each period about the damages from an 
increase in emissions for a stock pollutant, it cares about those damages for more periods. As η 
varies, those two counteracting components of the income effect approximately cancel each 
other out. 
 
 
Fig. 11. Sensitivity analysis — effect of pollution decay rate (η) on pollution. 
 
Finally, I investigate the assumption about emissions from the rest of the world, erow. In the 
base case, this level of emissions is constant and is equal to three times the steady-state level of 
domestic emissions. I consider two alternate specifications of erow, one in which it is just equal 
to domestic steady-state emissions and another in which it equals six times domestic steady-state 
emissions. If the level of pollution from the rest of the world is really high, policy should be very 
responsive to productivity shocks, since the marginal benefits of abatement will be higher. On 
the other hand, the impact of domestic policy is less important when erow is very high, and thus 
there is less need for responsiveness to shocks. On net, the impact of erow on the impulse 
response functions is not noticeable. Optimal policy is slightly more responsive to shocks when 
erow is smaller; the response of abatement spending one period after a 1% productivity shock is 
a 1.42% increase when erow equals domestic emissions and is a 1.38% increase when erow is six 
times domestic emissions. 
 
Under all parameter values studied, a positive productivity shock causes optimal emissions to 
increase relative to the steady state. In other words, the price effect dominates the income 
effect.32 Can the income effect dominate the price effect? The price effect is driven in part by the 
convexity of the abatement cost function g — this makes it very costly to 
increase abatement. In a simulation where all parameters are kept at their base case values except 
θ2 = 0.1, so that g is concave, the income effect dominates the price effect. After a positive 
productivity shock, emissions initially rise. But after 40 periods, optimal emissions fall below 
their steady-state value, suggesting that the price effect dominates in the early periods after a 
shock, but eventually the income effect catches up. If, in addition to changing θ2 to 0.1, we also 
change 1−γ to 0.2, the income effect dominates starting just 12 periods after the shock. 
All of the simulations come from a shock to total factor productivity, which creates both an 
income and a price effect. This is a departure from much of the literature that models a reduced 
form abatement cost function with potential shocks to the slope of that function. In that case, 
when the value of the shock is known by both firms and regulators, the policy implications are 
clear since only a price effect arises: when abatement costs more, optimal policy is to abate less. 
This model can include shocks directly to abatement costs, and it can make those shocks 
autocorrelated, by including a shock term in the linearized equation for abatement costs (z). 
When such a shock is simulated in this model, the expected result is reached. During periods of 
high abatement cost, optimal policy is to abate less. However, the focus of this paper is to extend 
beyond a model with direct shocks to abatement, and to consider instead aggregate productivity 
shocks, where the direction of the response of optimal policy is not as clear.33 
 
5. Decentralized economy 
 
The model above represents a social planner’s problem: the representative agent chooses 
investment, consumption, and emissions simultaneously to maximize total discounted utility. 
Thus, all externalities are internalized. If the goal is to find optimal environmental policy in 
response to correlated productivity shocks, then this model is helpful to find the levels of these 
variables that would maximize utility in the presence of these shocks. However, the model does 
not explicitly specify the particular policy that a government can take to achieve these first best 
results in the presence of the environmental externality. For this problem, I turn to an extension 
of the model where decision-making is decentralized among competitive firms, utility-
maximizing individuals, and a benevolent government. The government can choose an emissions 
tax levied on firms; the online appendix demonstrates how this policy is equivalent to a quantity 
restriction.34 
 
First consider the behavior of the representative firm.35 It seeks to maximize profits by choosing 
the appropriate level of capital and abatement. Its profit function is  
 
πt = yt − τtet −rtkt−1 – zt 
 
where τt is the emissions tax rate and rt is the endogenously determined cost of capital. The price 
of output and the price of abatement are both normalized to one. The firms maximize profit 
subject to the emissions function et = (1−μt ) · h(yt ) and the abatement cost function zt = yt g(μt). 
An externality arises because the firm does not take into account its emissions’ impact on the 
pollution stock and on productivity; i.e. it takes xt as given.36 
 
The firm’s profit maximizing behavior sets the marginal value product of capital equal to the 
rental rate and the marginal value product of abatement equal to its price, normalized to one. 
Thus, 
 
 
 
Next, consider the behavior of the representative consumer. The consumer is the owner of capital 
and rents it out at the market rate rt . The emissions tax is determined exogenously and hence 
taken as given. Consumption and investment are chosen subject to a budget constraint 
 
 
 
The consumer’s income in each period comes from three sources: the rental income from the 
capital owned by the consumer and rented by the firm at rate rt , the emissions tax revenues 
collected by the government and returned to the consumer, and the firm profits, since the firm is 
owned by the consumer. The consumer does not directly spend anything on abatement; that 
decision is made by the firm and taken as given by the consumer. The consumer’s maximization 
problem is 
 
where the firm’s decisions determine rt , et , and πt , and thus those are all exogenous to the 
consumer. The consumer’s problem can be expressed as choosing a path {kt } to maximize total 
discounted utility. The first order condition for the choice of ct is 
 
 
Emissions, profits, and the rate of return are all considered exogenous by the consumer. Thus the 
first order condition above simply sets the marginal cost of an additional unit of investment 
(foregone consumption this period) equal to its marginal benefit (the expected value of additional 
consumption next period). 
 
A benevolent government chooses the optimal tax rate given the behavior of the firm and the 
consumer. In other words, the government solves a Ramsey problem by choosing {τt } to 
maximize total expected discounted utility, given the constraints from the firm’s profit 
maximizing behavior and the constraints from the consumer’s profit maximizing behavior.37 
The government considers how its choice of τt affects consumer and firm choices and thus social 
welfare. The government’s problem is 
 
 
 
The series of constraints can be reduced in number by exploiting the fact that many of the 
constraints and first order conditions provide an implicit mapping of variables. The firm’s first 
order condition for abatement expenditure defines μt = μ(τt , yt ). Then, because both et and zt 
depend only on μt , and yt , I can use the functions et = e(τt , yt ) and zt = z(τt , yt ). Finally, the 
firm’s first order condition for capital demand defines rt = r(τt , yt ,kt−1). Making these 
substitutions, along with the resource constraint for ct , yields a government problem with four 
constraints per period. The Lagrangian for this problem is: 
 
 
 
The first constraint is from the consumer’s first order condition, the second is the pollution 
evolution equation, and the third is the production function. The Lagrangian multipliers for each 
constraint in period t are λt , ζt , and ωt , respectively. The first order equations for this problem 
are presented in the online appendix. The solution can be found computationally by log-
linearizing the system and using the AMA. 
 
Fig. 12 presents simulation results from a decentralized economy. Parameters are kept at the base 
case values, and the economy faces the same set of productivity shocks as in Fig. 5. Fig. 12 
shows the cyclical components of output y, emissions e, and the emissions tax for a 100 period 
simulation. As the online appendix shows, any outcome under the tax policy can also be 
achieved by a regulator who has access to a quantity policy, for instance a cap-and-trade scheme. 
This equivalence holds when the regulator has symmetric information about all state variables; 
later I consider information asymmetry. Thus the simulation in Fig. 12 can also be interpreted as 
modeling a quantity policy where the quota is optimally adjusted; emissions e in Fig. 12 would 
just be set equal to the chosen level of the quota. As in the centralized economy, the optimal 
level of emissions closely follows output. During expansions (such as the long one that occurs 
between about periods 20 and 60), the optimal response of emissions rises, because abatement is 
relatively more expensive when productivity is higher. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Decentralized economy. 
 
However, this is not achieved by reducing the emissions tax during expansions, as might be 
intuited. The emissions tax is also procyclical. How are higher emissions achieved in 
expansionary periods from higher emissions taxes? Because productivity shocks affect 
abatement costs, the marginal cost of abatement is higher during expansions. Also, the stock of 
capital responds positively to productivity shocks, and a higher level of capital increases baseline 
emissions. Without an increase in the emissions tax during expansions, emissions would increase 
more than optimally during these periods, and a countercyclical tax policy would exacerbate the 
problem. The simulation under the centralized economy shows that optimal emissions policy is 
procyclical, with emissions rising during expansions. However, the tax policy simulation shows 
that in an important way the policy is countercyclical, since the emissions tax rate increasing 
during expansions means that emissions are lower than they otherwise would be during 
expansions. The optimal path of emissions is procyclical, but not as procyclical as would hold 
without policy responding optimally to shocks. 
 
The following three observations can be garnered from this simple extension of the model to a 
decentralized economy. First, although emissions follow output, rising during expansions and 
falling during recessions, this is achieved with a tax rate that rises during expansions and falls 
during recessions. Because abatement is costlier during expansions, the emissions tax must rise 
to keep emissions from overshooting their optimal trajectory. Second, the volatilities of the 
emissions tax and emissions itself are about equal. One may think that an emissions tax would 
have to vary less with productivity fluctuations than would emissions, though this turns out to 
not be the case.38 Third and finally, a potentially interesting political economy observation can 
be made. During recessions it may be politically difficult or infeasible to get an emissions policy 
strengthened; consumers and producers will likely lobby against anything that may increase 
costs. If the policy is an emissions quota, then optimal policy is strengthened during recessions 
(the quota is reduced). However, if the policy is an emissions tax, it is weakened during 
recessions (the tax is reduced). Weakening policy during recessions may be more politically 
feasible than strengthening policy, perhaps suggesting an advantage of taxes over quotas in their 
ability to respond to productivity fluctuations.39 As mentioned in the Introduction, the permit 
price in the initial RGGI auction was below expectations. The analysis here suggests that the cap 
should be have been lowered because of the recession. If the policy had instead been a tax, it 
may have been politically easier to lower the tax rate (optimally) during the recession. 
 
These observations must be made with an important caveat. While information asymmetry 
between regulators and consumers or firms is the key component of the “prices versus 
quantities” literature pioneered by Weitzman (1974), the specification here has no such 
information asymmetry. Firms, consumers, and the government all face uncertainty about future 
values of productivity, but each agent’s information set is identical: they observe lagged values 
of the stock variables kt−1 and xt−1 and the current productivity shock at . To the extent that the 
simulation results here suggest that prices may be preferable to quotas due to the fact that the 
optimal tax drops during recessions and rises during expansions, this omits considerations of 
information asymmetries. Previous studies find that those considerations tend to support taxes 
over quotas as the optimal instrument for CO2 (e.g. Newell and Pizer, 2003); this study suggests 
an alternate reason for the same conclusion. 
 
The model can be extended to consider the effects of information asymmetry on optimal policy 
in a decentralized economy. If government has to set its policy each period before it observes the 
state, then the government’s first-order conditions will not hold. Instead, the government may 
choose the policy based on whatever information set it has available. For example, the tax 
chosen in period t may be a function of the value of the productivity shock observed in period t − 
1, or of the value of output in period t − 1, or a combination of both. In this case of limited 
information, the government’s first order conditions in the model are replaced by an equation 
relating the current emissions tax to the specified variables. The resulting system, since it is still 
linear in proportional deviations from steady-state values, can be solved with AMA, and the 
dynamics can be evaluated. 
 
Given this information constraint placed on the government, I can solve for the second-best 
policy option. But with the information asymmetry, the tax policy and a quota policy are no 
longer equivalent. I can solve separately for the second best policy using either instrument. For 
example, in the case of a tax policy, suppose that the government is constrained to set the tax in 
period t, in proportional deviation from its steady-state value, as a linear function of the deviation 
of output in period t − 1.40 The policy is τt = d · yt−1, where d is a policy parameter representing 
how the tax should respond to lagged output. The optimal policy is found by choosing the value 
of d that minimizes the difference between the impulse response function of consumption under 
the unconstrained and constrained scenarios. For the tax case, this value is 1.415; the optimal tax 
in period t should be about 142% of the deviation from steady-state output in period t − 1. For a 
quantity policy with the same information constraint, the government’s policy is qt = d · yt−1, 
and the optimal value for d is 0.658. As in the optimal solution with no information asymmetry, 
both the optimal tax and the optimal policy are procyclical. The optimal quantity policy varies 
significantly less than does the optimal tax policy. Though these second-best policy rules are 
obviously inferior to the first-best rules found in the centralized model, they may be the most 
relevant policy prescriptions of the model, since indexing emissions targets to GDP has been 
suggested as a viable policy option (Newell and Pizer, 2008; Pizer, 2005).41 
 
Conclusion 
 
Recessions can motivate policymakers to enact significant policy changes, or they can prevent 
them from doing so; the failure of a prominent climate bill in the US Senate in June 2008 may be 
attributed in part to fears of increased energy costs in the face of an upcoming recession. To 
answer the question posed in this paper’s title, a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium real 
business cycle model that features damages from the stock pollutant carbon dioxide is calibrated 
and solved. Climate change abatement is costly, and since damages are roughly smooth over the 
business cycle, it makes sense to smooth costs out over the business cycle. A first-best solution 
to the social planner’s problem finds that the optimal level of emissions increases with 
productivity. Thus, a quantity policy is relaxed during economic expansions and tightened during 
recessions. This result is attributed to an income effect, in which economic expansions create a 
higher demand for clean air, being outweighed by a price effect, in which achieving a particular 
level of emissions is costlier during an economic expansion because of increased productivity. 
This result is robust to various parameterizations of the model. Finally, I model a decentralized 
economy, where firms maximize profits, consumers maximize utility, and the government 
chooses a tax to maximize social welfare. This model shows how asymmetric information affects 
optimal policy and the choice between prices and quantities. 
 
The response of policy to business cycle fluctuations may be second-order relative to questions 
about secular trends in emissions, abatement, and climate change. However, it is still important. 
The compensating variation ($950 million per year) is modest but not negligible, especially 
considering that the cost savings from the optimal policy are not uniformly distributed across the 
economy — poorer households and carbon-intensive firms are more likely to benefit more than 
proportionally. The compensating variation calculation does not compare the dynamically 
optimal policy to no policy, but it compares the dynamically optimal policy to the best static 
policy. Given a cap-and-trade scheme, the cost of adjusting the cap with the business cycle is 
likely low relative to its benefit. A more complete analysis would incorporate both secular and 
cyclical features. Since virtually all prior research incorporates only secular trends, first 
considering only cyclical effects is a good place to start. 
 
The model solves for a steady state and focuses on deviations about that equilibrium. Is the 
economy at a steady state regarding carbon policy? Though the basic model here does not 
consider growth, the online appendix presents an extension to the model that includes exogenous 
growth in production technology and abatement technology. Along the steady-state growth path 
of this model, pollution is constant, since these two growth rates just offset each other. In an 
alternate model with a different specification of damages, the pollution stock can be increasing 
or decreasing, depending on parameter values. Realistically, though, a growth path with an 
increasing stock of atmospheric greenhouse gases is probably unsustainable, given the 
predictions from climate scientists about the scale of likely damages from even the current level 
of greenhouse gas concentrations. Thus, a steady-state growth path must involve a reduction in 
the pollution stock over time. But, carbon emissions and stocks are currently increasing, not 
decreasing, both domestically and globally. 
 
If the economy is not currently on a steady-state growth path, how does one interpret the model 
and results? One interpretation is that this model only gives policy recommendations regarding 
the economy once it has reached a steady-state growth path. A second interpretation is that the 
model can also give policy recommendations along the transition path to the steady state (i.e., 
right now). This second interpretation requires the assumption that cycles about the transition 
behave the same as cycles about the steady-state growth path, once each respective trend is 
filtered out. For example, this assumption requires that the elasticity of detrended emissions with 
respect to detrended GDP is the same along the transition path as it has been in the past. But any 
model about carbon policy must make assumptions about future technologies, either cyclical 
models like this one or secular models like Nordhaus (2008). Predictions of future technologies 
are inherently laden with uncertainty; one can think of this model’s predictions as a central 
estimate and use sensitivity analysis to examine alternate assumptions. Dropping the assumption 
of a constant elasticity and solving the model through value function iteration shows that when 
the elasticity is higher, the sensitivity of optimal emissions to the productivity shock is greater. 
This suggests that the qualitative results are robust, though the quantitative results may be 
subject to inaccuracy near term. 
 
The model makes several simplifying assumptions that can be relaxed to answer other important 
questions. Because it contains only one representative agent, the model says nothing about 
distributional issues. Because it contains only one representative firm, it cannot address the cost 
advantages of taxes or tradable permits over command and control policies in the presence of 
heterogeneous abatement costs. By including banking and borrowing of emissions permits the 
model could analyze how those policy options affect the government’s ability to optimally 
respond to cycles. Labor is not included as an input to production, so the effect of business 
cycles on employment is not considered here, though that area has been studied extensively in 
the RBC literature, and in the context of climate policy in Fischer and Springborn (2009). 
Behavioral anomalies are not modeled here; the representative agent is rational. This may be 
relevant to how policy could respond to business cycles. For example, loss aversion may affect 
optimal policy during recessions.42 Technology can grow in the model, but not endogenously. 
Lastly, the model presented is a quite basic DSGE business cycle model where the only 
stochastic element is an autocorrelated productivity shock. Other elements sometimes included in 
DSGE models, including intermediate goods producers, Keynesian price dynamics, and 
monetary effects, are omitted.43 
 
This paper presents the first study of how productivity shocks affect optimal environmental 
policy in an RBC context. Adapting to business cycles is important, perhaps more so for a policy 
as significant as climate change policy. As regional and federal regulation to mitigate climate 
change moves ahead, the implications of business cycles on policy choices are likely to be 
important components to achieving efficiency. 
 
Endnotes 
 
1 For instance, during the debate over a cap-and-trade bill in the US House of Representatives in 
2009, three amendments were unsuccessfully offered to the bill that would have suspended the 
program if gasoline prices exceed $5 per gallon, if electricity prices climb by 10%, or if the 
unemployment rate hits 15%. 
 
2 Kelly (2005) also considers the effects of productivity shocks on environmental policy, in a 
static setting. 
 
3 See Fell et al. (2008), Newell and Pizer (2003), Hoel and Karp (2002), and Pizer (2002) for 
examples of papers with a dynamic model of environmental policy but without modeling 
productivity shocks. 
 
4 Chay and Greenstone (2003) estimate the effect of air pollution on infant mortality in a quasi-
experimental design where the 1981–1982 recession affects emissions differentially across 
counties. 
 
5 Available at: http://cdiac.esd.ornl.gov/trends/emis_mon/emis_mon_co2.html. These estimates 
are based on reported fuel consumption from the Energy Information Administration in the 
Monthly Energy Review for several types of fossil fuels. Each type of fuel is converted into its 
associated level of carbon dioxide emissions, based on fuel-specific carbon dioxide emissions 
factors from the EPA. 
 
6 Emissions data unadjusted for seasonality exhibit a large peak during the winter months and a 
smaller peak during summer months. The data are seasonally adjusted using the Census Bureau’s 
X-12-ARIMA program, available at http://www.census.gov/srd/www/x12a/. 
 
7 See Hodrick and Prescott (1997). Among the many papers that analyze time series using the HP 
filter are Kydland and Prescott (1982), and Chang and Kim (2007). See Baxter and King (1999) 
for comparisons of alternative filters. 
 
8 As it appears in the graph, the correlation between the two series is higher in the first half of the 
period (0.714) than in the second half (0.164), though still significantly positive in both. 
 
9 The optimal lag lengths and differencing were determined by minimizing the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) or Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC) (same result). Both series 
are non-stationary; an augmented Dickey–Fuller test finds strong evidence for unit roots in each 
series (for log of GDP, the test statistic is −0.033 with a p-value of 0.9557; for log of CO2 
emissions the test statistic is −0.708 with a p-value of 0.8446). Both series are integrated of order 
one. 
 
10 In this regression, minimizing the AIC or BIC dictates an ARIMA(1, 1, 2) regression. 
 
11 Killian (2009) and Balke et al. (2010) consider the endogeneity of oil prices to economic 
activity. 
 
12 See King et al. (1988). Newell and Pizer (2003) incorporate both growth and cyclical effects in 
their reduced form function for emissions abatement costs. 
 
13 An alternative modeling choice is to include pollution as directly affecting the utility function, 
rather than production. This alternative may be more appropriate for conventional pollutants that 
directly affect health. Carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases, by contrast, are expected to 
affect the production possibilities of the world economy (Nordhaus, 2008). An earlier version of 
this paper, which employed this alternative modeling choice but calibrated the model to carbon 
dioxide emissions, yielded qualitatively similar results (available upon request). 
 
14 Fischer and Springborn (2009) consider labor fluctuations in a DSGE model with productivity 
shocks and emissions policy. 
 
15 limt→∞ βt Fx(xt , xt+1)xt = 0, where F is the agent’s utility as a function of state variables x 
and Fx is the derivative with respect to any of the current period state variables xt . 
 
16 These papers do not model carbon emissions, but that does not invalidate using their 
macroeconomic parameters here since firms and households in the economy were not responding 
to any carbon policy. See Bartz and Kelly (2008) for a calibration of a deterministic model 
similar to the stochastic model here. 
 
17 See Fischer and Springborn (2009) for an RBC model of pollution policy that incorporates 
endogenous labor. 
 
18 Kelly (2005) finds, in a similar though static model, that the value of the coefficient of relative 
risk aversion affects the choice of quotas vs. taxes. Under his modeling assumptions, a quota 
dominates when the coefficient exceeds one-half. 
 
19 Falk and Mendelsohn (1993) and Nordhaus (1991) use a decay rate implying a half-life of 139 
years. Reilly (1992) assumes a half-life of 83 years. Moore and Braswell (1994) estimate the 
half-life of atmospheric CO2 under a range of different assumptions, and consequently find a 
range of answers, from 19 to 92 years 
 
20 Because d is defined over gigatons of carbon and the model yields pollution stock in arbitrary 
units, these coefficients are scaled to keep the proportional output loss consistent. 
 
21 See the online appendix for an extension to the model allowing for growth in abatement 
technology. 
 
22 See the conclusion for a discussion of the interpretation of these results given that the economy 
is likely not on a steady-state growth path when it comes to greenhouse gas emissions. 
 
23 Anderson and Moore (1985). I use a Matlab application provided by the Boston Fed 
(http://www.bos.frb.org/economic/econbios/fuhrer/matlab.htm). Anderson (2008) compares the 
practicality of several different methods for solving linear rational expectations models and finds 
that the AMA provides the highest accuracy and significant gains in computational efficiency. 
 
24 I also solve the model without linearizing by using value function iteration (VFI). The 
solutions under this method are nearly identical to those from the AMA, suggesting that the 
linearization dose not introduce appreciable error, given that I am looking only at small 
deviations. Later, when I consider a growth model that allows for an emissions elasticity that 
changes with income, I use VFI. VFI code is also available online. 
 
25 The income effect being dominated is unsurprising given that it comes from a temporary 
though persistent shock to income, which is small compared to permanent income. A two 
standard deviation positive shock to productivity increases total discounted output by less than 
one-hundredth of a percent, compared to total discounted output with no positive shock. 
 
26 Setting an aggregate cap on emissions as a function of aggregate output differs from allocating 
permits across firms based on firm-level output. The latter, output-based allocation schemes, can 
create distortions (Bushnell and Chen, 2009), mitigate pre-existing distortions (Fischer and Fox, 
2007), or affect distributional outcomes (Fullerton and Heutel, 2010). 
 
27 Because I do not have to linearize the objective function in these simulations, I avoid the 
“pitfalls” of welfare analysis identified in Kim and Kim (2007). 
 
28 The same method is found in Lucas (1987). Tallarini (2000) finds higher proportional welfare 
differences with increased risk aversion. 
 
29 This back-of-the-envelope calculation comes from Nordhaus’s (2008) reported global net-
present-value benefit of $3 trillion. Allocating the benefits uniformly across all years, at an 
annual discount rate of 5% this implies annual global net benefits of $150 billion. Allocating the 
US’s share of those benefits proportional to population (4.6% of world population) yields the 
reported figure. 
 
30 These data are available at http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_coun.html. I thank an 
anonymous referee for providing the calculations. Similarly, one may worry that the emissions 
elasticity varies by nation. Gregg et al. (2008) find this comparing CO2 emissions from China 
and the US. This paper, however, focuses on domestic emissions and policy. 
 
31 Throughout this analysis, the impulse response functions plotted are in proportional change 
from the steady-state value, and the steady-state values of the variables differ under each 
parameter set. 
 
32 Fig. 7 shows that when the emissions elasticity (1 − γ ) is low enough, the fraction of output 
spent on emissions (μ) decreases after a positive productivity shock. But, as Fig. 6 shows, the 
absolute level of emissions still increases. 
 
33 A potentially interesting extension could consider if the abatement technology shocks were 
correlated with the TFP shocks, in which case the two effects could either support each other or 
cancel each other out, depending on the sign of the correlation. 
 
34 These are by no means the only policies that governments could actually enact. Governments 
may subsidize abatement, tax consumption, output, or capital, etc. The emissions tax and quota, 
though, directly address the relevant externality. 
 
35 I do not model entry or exit, the equilibrium number of firms, or firm size. 
 
36 In this model with one consumer owning the one firm, the pollution externality may be 
internalized if the consumer controls the behavior of the firm and departs from profit-
maximizing behavior because of pollution; see Gordon (2003). 
 
37 The government is able to dynamically adapt the policy in light of new information on 
productivity shocks and state variables. This is thus a “feedback” policy, as defined in Hoel and 
Karp (2002). The alternative is an “open-loop” policy, where the government must choose the 
entire policy trajectory at the initial period. This other extreme, as well as other policy options 
along the spectrum between these two extremes, is considered later, when I allow for information 
asymmetry between regulators and firms/consumers. I assume that the government can commit 
to future tax rates; see Kydland and Prescott (1977). The government’s optimal policy can be 
thought of as a Taylor rule for emissions policy. 
 
38 Intuition might prescribe that, since the pollution stock is not varying by much, the marginal 
damages from emissions are not varying by much, and thus the emissions tax should not vary by 
much, compared to the quantity restriction. However, the government’s first order condition for 
the choice of the emissions tax equates marginal costs with marginal benefits, where marginal 
costs are from foregone consumption. Since consumption is changing with the business cycle, 
the marginal cost of the emissions tax is also changing. It is this variance in consumption, not in 
the pollution stock, that leads to the variance in the emissions tax. 
 
39 Economically, comparing the tax rate with the quota quantity is an apples-to-oranges 
comparison, but politically these are the two values that are likely to be compared to each other. 
The argument here is that, once in place, quotas are hard to reduce in a recession. But others 
have argued that quotas are more politically feasible than taxes (Stavins, 2008). 
 
40 That is, the regulators observes neither at , kt−1, nor xt−1 directly. 
 
41 In principle one could calculate the welfare difference between the second-best linear tax 
policy and the second-best linear quota policy. However, in practice the welfare ordering 
between the policies is dependent on the draw of shocks. 
 
42 To address a similar concern, Fujii and Karp (2008) develop a method for computing optimal 
long-run climate policy paths under a non-constant pure rate of time preference. 
 
43 Gali (1999, 2004) argues that technology shocks play only a limited role, if any, in explaining 
business cycles, though this is disputed by Christiano et al. (2003). 
 
Appendix A. Supplementary material 
The online version of this article contains additional supplementary material. 
Please visit doi:10.1016/j.red.2011.05.002. 
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